Insights

September 10, 2025

The Clorox Company’s 2023 Cyberattack: What Really Happened and Why It Matters

By Jaimee Horn

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Iron Summary

Your quick look at the story before we dig deeper.

In August 2023, Clorox confirmed a cyberattack that disrupted its IT systems, slowed production, and led to product shortages across major household brands like Pine-Sol, Glad, and Burt’s Bees. Losses were estimated at $356 million, making this one of the most damaging cyber incidents of the year. The attack, suspected to be the work of the group Scattered Spider, showcased the power of social engineering. It’s a reminder that protecting the “human factor” is just as critical as protecting networks.



What happened in the Clorox cyberattack?

On August 14, 2023, Clorox filed with the SEC that it had “identified unauthorized activity” in its IT systems. At first, the company believed the incident was contained, but the fallout proved otherwise.

  • Disruptions: Order processing slowed dramatically, forcing manual workflows.
  • Product shortages: Cleaning products vanished from shelves as supply chains stalled.
  • Financial impact: Clorox projected a 23–28% drop in first-quarter net sales, alongside $356 million in total damages.

This attack affected more than just the IT team. It disrupted business continuity, supply chains, and consumer trust.

Who was behind the attack?

According to Bloomberg, investigators believe the group known as Scattered Spider, also called Muddled Libra or UNC3944, carried out the breach. Despite their youth (some members are thought to be between 17 and 22), the group has been linked to over 100 attacks on enterprise-level organizations.

Their method? Social engineering. By impersonating employees and convincing IT support to reset credentials, they gained admin-level access. From there, they could infiltrate systems, demand ransom, and stall operations.

Social engineering isn’t flashy malware. It’s persuasion. In fact, 98% of cybercrimes in 2022 involved it, making it one of the simplest yet most devastating attack vectors.

Why social engineering is so dangerous

Unlike brute-force hacking, social engineering targets people, not machines. By exploiting trust, oversights, or gaps in training, attackers bypass even the most advanced security tech.

Today’s attackers also leverage AI and deepfake tools to add layers of deception: voice clones, video impersonations, and realistic phishing attempts. In the case of manufacturers like Clorox, once attackers breach a single link, they can pivot across third-party vendors and partners, creating a full supply chain nightmare.

The bigger picture: SEC rules and business continuity

The Clorox incident came just as the SEC introduced new rules requiring public companies to disclose material cybersecurity events within four business days. The intent is twofold:

  1. Bring cybersecurity into the boardroom. By 2026, Gartner predicts 70% of boards will include at least one cybersecurity expert.
  2. Increase transparency. No more quietly paying ransoms to keep breaches out of the news.

This shift forces companies to adopt proactive strategies, not just reactive defense.

Lessons learned and recommendations

If the Clorox cyberattack proves anything, it’s that prevention is far cheaper than response. Businesses need to:

  • Train staff continuously. Call centers and IT help desks are common entry points.
  • Harden identity management. Protect high-privilege accounts with multi-factor authentication and strict reset protocols.
  • Use AI for defense. AI-powered monitoring, anomaly detection, and employee simulations can prepare teams for evolving tactics.
  • Prioritize business continuity. Incident response plans should account not just for IT recovery, but also for supply chain disruption and customer impact.

The Clorox case shows that cyberattacks have a cost beyond dollars. They shake consumer trust and destabilize operations long after the initial incident.



Strategic Reflections

  1. If hackers called my company’s help desk today, how easily could they reset an admin account?
  2. Do our continuity plans cover supply chain disruptions, not just IT outages?
  3. How can we train employees to recognize and resist increasingly convincing social engineering tactics?